Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents by Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid

Author:Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht

7 Feeling and Coming to Feel Togetherness

Following Helm, it is possible to extend the idea that our emotions play a central role in constituting and disclosing the significance something has by addressing those cases in which one primarily cares about someone else (cf. 2008, pp. 29ff.). These are usually situations, Helm observes, in which we are concerned with the wellbeing and flourishing of another being as a caring being; situations, hence, in which we are caring about this other being in a particular respect, namely as another being with whom we share our care-defined way of being.

This simple analysis of what it means to care about another person as a person brings us to see in which sense we may come to be secondarily concerned with the ‘wellbeing’ of something while caring about the wellbeing of someone else. For, insofar as the wellbeing of the person in question is, to some extent at least, related to the ‘wellbeing’ of the objects she cares about, we usually come to care about what she cares about while caring about her. In a complementary way, and by virtue of our being rather passively involved (as objects of care) in situations such as normal child rearing practices, we may come to respond emotionally, in a more-or-less systematic manner, to some occurrences that have either in themselves or in view of further possible occurrences importance for certain others who care about us.

By means of these two sorts of processes, in the course of our repeated encounters with certain others we may come to respond simultaneously to some occurrences able to positively or negatively affect some possible objects of concern. In this way, we may begin to have in common with these others some concrete ways of being oriented in emotionally motivated circumspection towards a range of other worldly beings and occurrences.

It is, however, important not to overlook the asymmetry that characterizes the interpersonal relationships just described. For, although we can regard these processes as processes by virtue of which we become prepared to respond simultaneously to the significance something has for us (the involved individuals), we do not have to regard them as processes that prepare us to respond together to this significance. This is the reason why these situations quite often only instantiate the mode of caring Heidegger calls caring-for [Fürsorge] (1962 [1927], p. 157), and not the one I have called caring-with. In order to clarify the relevant difference, I shall address what we could call our ultimate object of care; what Heidegger calls the for-the-sake-of-which [das Worum] of our emotionally disclosed concern (p. 180).

Coming back to our example, we can begin to understand in how far we (the volleyball players) may be said to be affectively engaged with the world in a completely different way by emphasizing that in this case we would expect from one another to care about something as members of a team we care about. That is, we would expect from one another to be emotionally oriented towards something that, as Helm emphasizes, is worth pursuing for the sake of our group (2008).

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